

FREEING OURSELVES: THE EXPERIENCE OF
THE PRISONS INFORMATION GROUP
(IN LIGHT OF FOUCAULT'S 1973 RIO
LECTURES)¹

In 1973, Michel Foucault travelled to Brazil to give a series of lectures titled “Truth and Juridical Forms” in the Languages Department of the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio). Brazil was not the only foreign country he visited. He also went to Japan, Poland, Tunisia, and Sweden, among other countries. His trips to the United States in the 1980s are well-known. Work on the impact of Foucault’s journeys to the Far East, Eastern Europe, the “Tropics,” and the “New World” is still developing. What can already be inferred, however, is that his travels did not have the objective of spreading a eulogy of a European culture that would be superior, rational, disciplined, civilized, and modern. It was Foucault himself, who, after all, was leaving the “Old World” with the diagnosis of the crisis of reason, of the disciplines and images of man and the subject of Western knowledge, as his lectures at PUC-Rio highlight so well.²

On the other hand, Foucault’s five visits to Brazil from 1965 to 1976 come up in some book-length analyses, most notably those of Heliana de Barros Conde Rodrigues and Roberto Machado.³ Conde emphasizes how Foucault was a tireless journeyman. In her words: “Travels were unsettling experiences for him, susceptible to contributing to the forging

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of new sets of problems, concepts and diagrams.”⁴ Conde captures the feelings of strangeness many experienced in relation to the constant changes in Foucault’s thought: “‘When he returns he is already other!’ cried those who, in praise or disapproval, revealed the impact provoked by the changes in the life and writings of Michel Foucault.”⁵

In the context of this observation, Conde does not fail to mention Foucault’s participation in a roundtable upon the completion of his lectures at PUC-Rio.⁶ On that occasion, Foucault offered the following critical observation about the persistence of power relations after the experience of revolution:

Someone here said that revolutionaries seek to take power. At that point, I would be a lot more anarchistic. It must be said that I am no anarchist in the sense that I do not admit this entirely negative conception of power, but I do not agree with you when you say that revolutionaries seek to take power. Or rather, I agree, adding ‘Thank God! Yes.’ For authentic revolutionaries, to conquer power means to take possession of a treasure from the hands of one class to deliver it to another class, the proletariat in this case. I believe that is the way revolution and the seizure of power are conceived. Observe then the Soviet Union. There we have a regime in which power relations in the family, in sexuality, in the factories, in the schools are the same. The question is knowing if we can, within the current regime, transform, at the microscopic level – at the school, in the family – power relations in such a way that, when a political-economic

revolution occurs, we would not find, afterwards, the same power relations that we find now. This is the problem of the Cultural Revolution in China...⁷

Here Foucault updates a certain anarchistic attitude in relation to power but he makes a point of emphasizing two differences: he does not believe that all power is evil and he does not admit a wholly negative conception of power.⁸ To transform power relations at their microscopic levels, Foucault sought another relationship with activists and developed his reflections on the importance of the production of new forms of subjectivities for such a transformation. In the following pages, I take up Foucault's concerns by highlighting the novelty of his experience of militancy on behalf of the Prisons Information Group (GIP) in the period right before his lectures at PUC-Rio.

THE NOVELTY OF THE GIP'S POLITICAL ACTION

Foucault, Daniel Defert, and others created the GIP, which operated between 1971 and 1972. The GIP interests me on account of the following topics raised by the editors of *Dits et écrits*: the context of the struggles around prisons from which the group as well as Maoists and other important leftist militants emerged; the specificity of the actions of the GIP, which made a point of collecting information inside the prison system through questionnaires clandestinely distributed among prisoners and their families; and the acts in support of the group from specific intellectuals, such as judges, physicians, and social workers.⁹

The GIP had manifold effects but I will restrict myself to two of them: the appearance of prisons as a relevant subject for

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discussion in the daily press and French radio and the questioning of the traditional leftist discourse, which distinguished between the proletariat and the “lumpenproletariat.” The GIP thus helped modify militancy in the aftermath of May 1968. According to Philippe Artières, Laurent Quérou, and Michelle Zancarini-Fournel, the history of the GIP goes beyond a biography of Foucault to relate to the intellectual conjuncture after May 1968, the political and social situation in the early 1970s, and prison policies in France from the end of the Second World War.¹⁰

The demonstrations of May 1968 brought together a large array of social groups, such as students, peasants, and workers. In this context of intense social struggle, the action of the Maoist, non-Leninist organization Proletarian Left (GP) stood out. The GP had, at its origin, two tendencies: a libertarian tendency and a Marxist one. The organization was disbanded in 1970 and its members went underground. In this manner, the police started to treat the actions of the GP as illegal and directly related to crime. It was from this moment that the GP began to receive the support of many intellectuals, including Jean-Paul Sartre. He actively supported the movement of the GP militants and was one of the intellectuals to defend the establishment of a “popular” justice as a means of struggle when faced with the justice of the State. The latter was denounced on all sides for its overt partiality. This debate lasted from 1970 to 1975. However, Sartre’s position was not a unanimous one. Foucault’s opposition to the popular court can be clearly understood in his dialogue with the Maoists from 1972. He engages in a genealogy of the popular court and

arrives at the conclusion that “the revolution can only take place via the radical elimination of the judicial apparatus.”¹¹

In September 1970, GP militants in prison started a hunger strike to obtain the status of political prisoners.¹² This manner of political demonstration was by then quite common and had been used in the collective actions of prisoners at the time of the war in Algeria between 1958 and 1961. After twenty-five days, the hunger strike had aroused only a lukewarm reaction in French public opinion. In January 1971, there was another hunger strike that had a greater impact in the press and generated more support. In an act of solidarity, students and professors ended up participating in the hunger strike. On February 8, 1971, a press conference took place to discuss all these events and communicate the end of the hunger strike. It is at this event that Foucault, Pierre Vidal-Naquet and Jean-Marie Domenach announced the formation of the GIP.

As Artières points out, the GIP was born through the discussion of “popular” courts among leftists and the struggle of imprisoned Maoists who, as I have already noted, claimed the status of political prisoners.¹³ He goes on to suggest that the GIP participated in a rupture because prison had become the venue of struggle for the first time, and common prisoners as well as political prisoners were actors in this fight. Artières makes this rupture explicit through an elaboration of important differences between the GIP and other leftist movements of the time. Among these differences, the GIP took an interest in the common prisoners, who were commonly seen as lumpenproletarian, and it did not have the objective of speaking for prisoners or setting itself up in spaces of exploitation.¹⁴ These differences clearly resonate in Foucault’s critique of the mili-

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tancy of the traditional left and the way of action specific to the intellectual. He did not propose to speak in the name of the “masses” or try to work alongside the downtrodden in factories, mines, or other spaces.

Defert also draws attention to the arrival of the GIP as first associated with the defense strategies of the GP but then as autonomous in relation to the Maoist militants.¹⁵ Still, according to Defert, the leaders of the GIP had resources in a traditional strategy in the history of communist movements, that is, alliances with great personalities among French intellectuals and organizations involved with the defense of civil rights. This was the reason why Sartre’s support was basic. By contrast, Foucault always favored effective work in place of “university chatter.”¹⁶ Defert speaks of the mode of manipulation Foucault loathed the most: the spectacular operations of personalities that presented themselves at the doors of prisons in the presence of photographers in the name of citizens being repressed and attacked by the police.¹⁷ Foucault also gestured to the similarity and difference between the GP and GIP in the choice of the initials that represented the group: the GIP showed the reference to and approximation with the GP, but it also had the “I” of its specificity, which meant the difference that specific intellectuals should introduce in the formation of the GIP.¹⁸

The GIP thus stood out for a political action that differed from the other leftist groups of the time. The anarchists also participated in the events that involved revolts in the French prisons in the early 1970s, but they expected violent action executed outside the prisons from the GIP, and they did not like the proximity the group had with Maoists. For their part, the Maoists expected the violence to originate in the interior of

the prisons, which would be a sign of the politicization of the inmates. There were also the demands from the philanthropic and Christian tradition, which acted directly on the prisons. It expected the proposal of reforms and improvements of the prison system from the GIP. The GIP did not share these expectations. As Defert asserts, “The objective of our group was, first of all, to render the prison inoperative as an instrument of political repression.”¹⁹ The GIP facilitated an unprecedented mobilization around the prison. Suddenly, “the penitentiary institution wavered” and “it was even imagined it could disappear.”²⁰

Defert thought that May 1968 had paid no attention to prisons, which were treated as if they did not symbolize forms of power. Common law prisoners were still subjected to the old Marxist suspicion of being lumpenproletarian in some political discourses. Artières reminds us that the GIP rejected this suspicion.²¹ It did not necessarily affirm that “all common law prisoners are political prisoners” so much as consider “the prison to be a daily venue of politics.”²²

Solidarity between political prisoners and common law prisoners, as between proletarians and lumpenproletarians, had not always existed. The division, according to Foucault, dates from the nineteenth century. It set up a break between a politically organized and unionized proletariat, on the one hand, and a lumpenproletariat, on the other hand.²³ From this moment on the solidarity between revolutionary movements and prison movements, which had a great importance in all the political revolutions of the nineteenth century (1830, 1848, and 1870), was broken.²⁴ But this connection appeared again in France when, at the time of the war in Algeria, there were many

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Algerian prisoners in French prisons claiming the status of political prisoners, as also happened with political prisoners in the period following May 1968, principally among Maoists. The GIP also played a great role in the questioning of this division, since, with the formation of the group, “the inmates learned that there was a movement abroad interested in their fate, a movement that was not simply a Christian or lay philanthropic movement, but a movement of political contestation of the prison.”²⁵

Despite his differences with Marxists, Foucault drew inspiration from Marxism at the time he was distributing questionnaires at the gates of the prisons. Soon after May 1968 there was a movement of students, intellectuals, and political militants to go into the factories to get to know the conditions of workers and radicalize them. This movement was known as *établissement*. Though its method was different from the method of the GIP, a parallel can be drawn between them.²⁶ They both used the distribution of questionnaires to workers or prisoners as the principal means of gathering information on conditions in factories and prisons, respectively. Moreover, in an attempt to renew Marxism amid the workers of Italy in 1961, Raniero Panzieri had accomplished a very similar project, collecting information directly from workers. All three groups re-activated a much older tradition of workers’ inquiries from the nineteenth century, as exemplified by Karl Marx’s 1880 “A Workers’ Inquiry.”²⁷

The objective of the GIP was to seek information inside the prisons. In order to accomplish this goal, a questionnaire was written that was meant for the inmates and their families. In this manner, the words of the prisoners could break the

silence, short-circuiting the production of all authorized discourses. The questionnaires were answered anonymously and the questions concerned all aspects of prison life.²⁸ They were clandestinely distributed inside prisons because the administration of the prisons would not permit the inmates to have access to any type of mail that alluded to their imprisoning. For the GIP, it was not then a matter of, as in the case of the *établissements*, “putting themselves in the place of the prisoners, but of making their conditions known, respecting their voices.”²⁹ The group considered the regime inside the prisons intolerable.³⁰ The GIP had no pretense of making the prisoners conscious of their situation. “They,” Foucault said of the prisoners, “possessed this conscience for a very long time, but it did not have the means of expressing itself.”³¹ In this sense, the conscience, reactions, indignations, and reflections on the situation in the prison existed in individuals, but they did not appear. It was necessary for the information to circulate, precisely by divulging the content of the questionnaires. “The method,” Foucault explained, “may be surprising but it is still the best. It is necessary for the information to appear; it is necessary to transform the individual experience into collective knowledge. That is, into political knowledge.”³²

Defert affirms that information is a struggle, as it brought into the public space knowledge about the daily experience of the inmates.³³ Prison conditions received, through the action of the GIP, a greater visibility in the French press, making it impossible for the prison administrations to disavow the information divulged through the questionnaires.³⁴ In all the rebellions that occurred in French prisons in 1970 and 1972 there was a general objective. “It is necessary,” as the pamphlet of a

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group of young lawyers from Lyon declared, “to end once and for all the mystery kept by the administration on what happens inside prisons.”³⁵

The GIP, according to Artières, made possible the emergence of a discourse belonging to inmates.³⁶ The action of the group “is, by the originality of its procedures, a noteworthy mark in the history of prisons and, in a wider sense, of the social movements of the 1970s.”³⁷ Artières suggests that the GIP is a political heritage left by Foucault, as it brought prison to the field of present day concerns, making visible the problems that surrounded it. Foucault also showed clearly the lack of dignity in speaking for others when he gave the inmates and their families the right to speak. In defending the view that the masses have no need of intellectuals to know their conditions or even reach an awareness of them, Foucault adopted the posture of a specific intellectual. This refusal to speak for the other and focus on the singular through the testimonies of prisoners clashed with other positions at the time. Defert maintains that when Sartre faced the same prison rebellions he insisted on “declaring that the inmates fought in the name of all, as if it were not dignified to fight for oneself.”³⁸

The practice of the GIP implicitly interrogated the relationship between intellectuals and workers. In place of the intellectual being charged with the mission of taking knowledge to the inmates, it was the testimonies of inmates in the questionnaires that made up the knowledge of the conditions in the prisons. The practice of the GIP thus inverted a commonplace hierarchy in the production and dissemination of knowledge. The group had as its slogan letting the prisoners speak.³⁹ It had no hierarchical organization or head. The GIP

was an anonymous organization underpinned by three personalities: Foucault, Domenach, and Vidal-Naquet. But they were only a support. Anyone who had anything to say about the prisons could participate in the group.

A GIP communiqué from 1972 likely authored by Foucault insisted that the GIP was not an intellectual tribunal or a subversive group that sought to inspire inmates from outside the prison. It insisted that the group never wished to speak for inmates, but to make them and their families speak for themselves.⁴⁰ As far as Foucault was concerned the problem was not to propose a model prison or the abolition of prison, as the mechanisms of marginalization present in the prisons were immersed in all social relationships.⁴¹ The objective was “to offer a critique of the system that explains the process by which present day society pushes a part of the population to the margins.”⁴²

During the time the GIP was active Foucault was also involved in the elaboration of his studies of the prison. In 1972, he taught his course *Théories et institutions pénales* at the Collège de France.⁴³ The following year he continued to speak on the subject of penal systems in his course *La société punitive*.⁴⁴ When he came to Brazil in 1973, he dealt with this subject in the third, fourth, and fifth lectures of “Truth and Juridical Forms.”⁴⁵ Foucault’s involvement with the GIP was not only intellectual or concerned with the production of scientific knowledge about prisons. He was not conducting sociological research with prisoners about their life conditions. Foucault postponed the writing of *Discipline and Punish* for two years so that inmates would not suppose that his militancy about the prisons was only speculative. He drastically changed

his militancy and thought after his participation in the group. The prison rebellions he had witnessed left him with important lessons about power relations. In his words from the end of the first chapter of *Discipline and Punish*: “That punishment in general and the prison in particular belong to a political technology of the body is a lesson that I have learnt not so much from history as from the present. In recent years, prison revolts have occurred throughout the world.”⁴⁶

BACK TO THE ROUNDTABLE IN RIO

In conclusion, I return to the roundtable in which Foucault participated after the delivery of his lectures “Truth and Juridical Forms” at PUC-Rio in 1973. I want to focus on the roundtable to bring out Foucault’s dialogue with a non-identified interlocutor on the definition of archeology. Foucault does not define it as an art, a theory, or a poem, but as a practice. His interlocutor teases him: “Is archeology a miraculous machine?”⁴⁷ Foucault’s answer points to archeology as a critical machine that calls into question certain power relationships. Besides, its liberating and critical function is remarkable. Coupled with genealogy, archaeology short-circuits the naturalness and necessity of the way power relationships operate in modernity, creating conditions of possibility for liberating ourselves from the infinite reproduction of the same type of relationships, even those of revolutionary experiences. Foucault argues, “I would say, in a much more pragmatic manner, that my machine is intrinsically good; not in so far as it transcribes or supplies the model of what happened, but in so far as it can furnish out of what has happened a model such as will permit us to free ourselves from what happened.”⁴⁸

Foucault's wager on a model that "will permit us to free ourselves from what just happened" brings me back to the experience of the GIP. I am therefore going to highlight the possible parallels that we can establish between this experience and the themes discussed in the Rio roundtable. Still elaborating the meaning of archaeology, Foucault describes it as a "historical-political activity" that would not simply be translated through books, speeches, or articles.⁴⁹ As a matter of fact, he even mentions the inconvenience of the obligation to reunite all of the meanings and objectives of archaeology in one book. Foucault concludes the question and answer session of the roundtable in the following manner: "It seems to me that it is about a simultaneously practical and theoretical activity that should be accomplished through books, speeches, and discussions, such as this one, through political actions, painting, music."⁵⁰ To consider the relations that exist between the GIP and the responses that Foucault elaborated after the delivery of his lectures in Rio in 1973 is therefore to try to understand the communication that he maintained between theory and practice, thought and militancy, discourse and life, as indicated in the passage above.

I want to proceed to highlight some of the resonances that the GIP could have provoked in Foucault's reflections on archaeology in the roundtable discussion. For example, when Foucault responds to the questions of Maria Teresa Amaral and Affonso Romano de Santa'Anna on the study of discourse for strategy, he goes back to the Sophists to explain that the practice of a discourse cannot be separated from the exercise of power. "To speak," Foucault affirms, "is to exercise power, to speak is to risk his power, to speak is to risk getting or losing

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everything.”⁵¹ I venture to suggest that Foucault understood the perceptions about the materiality of discourse and the battle around it while he and the GIP struggled for the disclosure of the abysmal living conditions that the prisoners confronted inside French prisons. The struggle for the disclosure of these conditions created a transformation in the mode by which public opinion and the French press informed a daily life that had been characterized by silence and a lack of knowledge about the prisons up to that point.

Foucault also could have understood “discourses” as “events” through the cut introduced by the words of the prisoners and their family members in the GIP questionnaires. This cut produced a battlefield, a strategic game, and a dispute not only with the low visibility given to topics about the prison in the French press, but also with the way in which political militancy and the fields of philosophy and history dealt with these topics. This theme allows me to get back to the discussion of Foucault’s struggle for another political militancy, principally through his own approximation to anarchism, as indicated in the introduction. Foucault’s critique of Marxism reappears in his response to Hélió Pelegrino’s question about psychoanalysis. “Even in Marxist theory,” Foucault declares, “we can find many examples of the renewal of power relations.”⁵² I suggest that Foucault’s years of political militancy on behalf of the GIP left him preoccupied with the non-renewal of old examples of the functioning of power.

I also wonder whether there would not be a resonance between the struggle that the GIP undertook on behalf of prisoners and Foucault’s understanding of the fundamental role of juridical practices in his study of power. We know that *Théories*

et institutions pénales and *La société punitive* treated these practices and how GIP militancy contributed to the elaboration of these studies. We also know how Foucault's reflections in these courses introduced historical elements for the diagnosis of emergence, provenance, and difference in relation to struggles in French prisons in the twentieth century. In this regard, I refer to how the GIP attempted to engage in the production of another conception of knowledge conveyed by prisoners and their family members, thereby short-circuiting conventional relations between discourse and power. In the roundtable, Foucault suggests this battle of discourses in his comments on the rupture between rhetoric and philosophy in his response to Machado's observation about the existence of other discourses in the history of knowledge.⁵³ Let me conclude my observations with Foucault's words:

The problem is to reintroduce rhetoric, the orator, the struggle of discourse inside the field of analysis, not, as with the linguists, to do a systematic analysis of rhetorical procedures, but to study discourse, even the discourse of truth, as rhetorical procedures, ways to win, produce events, produce decisions, produce battles and produce victories.⁵⁴

NOTES

- 1 Ricardo Pinheiro Lopes translated this contribution with the assistance of Marcelo Hoffman. It reproduces some heavily modified parts of Priscila Piazzentini Vieira, *A coragem da verdade e a ética do intelectual em Michel Foucault* (São Paulo: Intermeios/FAPESP, 2015). These parts are reproduced here with permission from Intermeios.
- 2 Michel Foucault, "La vérité et les formes juridiques," in *Dits et écrits 1954-1988*, Vol. 1, 1954-1975, ed. Daniel Defert and François Ewald

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- with the assistance of Jacques Lagrange (Paris: Quarto/Gallimard, 2001), 1406-1514.
- 3 Roberto Machado, *Impressões de Michel Foucault* (São Paulo: N-1 edições, 2017); Heliana de Barros Conde Rodrigues, *Ensaaios sobre Michel Foucault: Presença, efeitos, ressonâncias* (Rio de Janeiro: Lamparina, 2016).
 - 4 Conde, *Ensaaios sobre Michel Foucault*, 20.
 - 5 *Ibid.*, 23.
 - 6 *Ibid.*, 23-24. The rountable featured Helio Pellegrino, Chaim Katz, Roberto Machado, Luis Costa Lima, Milton José Pinto, Luís Felipe Baeta Neves, Rose Marie Muraro, Marcos Tavares do Amaral, Luís Alfredo Garcia Rosa, Maria Cecilia Baeta Neves, Miriam Taques Tamler, Magno Machado Dias, Roberto Oswaldo Cruz, Lea Porto de Abreu Novais, Maria Teresa Amaral, and Affonso Romano de Sant’Anna.
 - 7 Foucault, “La vérité et les formes juridiques,” 1510-1511.
 - 8 Foucault revisited this complicated relationship with anarchism at many moments in his life. One of the most important moments happened seven years later, with the proposal of an “anarcheology.” In this regard, see Michel Foucault, *On the Government of the Living: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1979-1980*, ed. Michel Senellart, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 78-79.
 - 9 Daniel Defert, François Ewald, and Jacques Lagrange, Introduction to “(Manifeste du G.I.P.),” by Michel Foucault, in *Dits et écrits 1954-1988*, Vol. 1, 1954-1975, 1042.
 - 10 Philippe Artières, Laurent Quéro, and Michelle Zancarini-Fournel, eds., *Le Groupe d’Information sur les Prisons: Archives d’une lutte, 1970-1972*, (Paris: Éditions de l’IMEC, 2003), 16-19.
 - 11 Michel Foucault, “On Popular Justice: A Discussion with Maoists,” in *Power/Knowledge: Selected Writings and Other Writings, 1972-1977*, ed. Colin Gordon, trans. Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham, and Kate Soper, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 16.
 - 12 Artières, Quéro, and Zancarini-Fournel, *Le Groupe d’Information sur les Prisons*, 27.

- 13 Philippe Artières, “Uma política menor. O GIP como lugar de experimentação política,” in *Foucault: filosofia & política*, ed. Guilherme Castelo Branco and Alfredo Veiga-Neto (Belo Horizonte: Autêntica Editora, 2011), 320.
- 14 Ibid.
- 15 Daniel Defert, “L’Émergence d’un nouveau front: les prisons,” in Artières, Quéro, and Zancarini-Fournel, *Le Groupe d’Information sur les Prisons*, 315.
- 16 Michel Foucault, “Le grand enfermement,” in *Dits et écrits 1954-1988*, Vol. 1, 1954-1975, 1169.
- 17 Defert, “L’Émergence d’un nouveau front,” 317.
- 18 Ibid., 320.
- 19 Ibid., 321.
- 20 Artières, Quéro, and Zancarini-Fournel, *Le Groupe d’Information sur les Prisons*, 11.
- 21 Ibid., 28.
- 22 Ibid., 28.
- 23 Michel Foucault, “Prisons et révoltes dans les prisons,” in *Dits et écrits 1954-1988*, Vol. 1, 1954-1975, 1293-1300.
- 24 Ibid., 1294.
- 25 Ibid.
- 26 Artières, Quéro, and Zancarini-Fournel, *Le Groupe d’Information sur les Prisons*, 29.
- 27 Ibid., 47.
- 28 The GIP produced reports based on the questionnaires distributed inside and outside the prisons. For an overview of these publications, see Defert, “L’Émergence d’un nouveau front,” 324-325.
- 29 Artières, Quéro, and Zancarini-Fournel, *Le Groupe d’Information sur les Prisons*, 48.

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- 30 Michel Foucault, “Enquête sur les prisons: brisons les barreaux du silence,” in *Dits et écrits 1954-1988*, Vol. 1, 1954-1975, 1045.
- 31 Ibid., 1045-1046.
- 32 Ibid., 1046.
- 33 Defert, “L’Émergence d’un nouveau front,” 324.
- 34 Artières, Quéro, and Zancarini-Fournel, *Le Groupe d’Information sur les Prisons*, 49.
- 35 Ibid., 216.
- 36 Artières, “Uma política menor,” 320.
- 37 Ibid., 321.
- 38 Defert, “L’Émergence d’un nouveau front,” 326.
- 39 Michel Foucault. “Le grand enfermement,” 1172.
- 40 Michel Foucault, “Je voudrais au nom du GIP dissiper un malentendu...,” in Artières, Quéro, and Zancarini-Fournel, *Le Groupe d’Information sur les Prisons*, 193.
- 41 Foucault, “Le grand enfermement,” 1174.
- 42 Ibid.
- 43 Michel Foucault, *Théories et institutions pénales: Cours au Collège de France (1971-1972)*, ed. Bernard E. Harcourt in collaboration with Elisabetta Basso and Claude-Olivier Doron and with the assistance of Daniel Defert (Paris: Gallimard/Seuil, 2015).
- 44 Michel Foucault, *La société punitive: Cours au Collège de France (1972-1973)*, ed. Bernard E. Harcourt (Paris: Gallimard, 2013).
- 45 Foucault, “La vérité et les formes juridiques,” 1438-1491.
- 46 Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), 30.
- 47 Foucault, “La vérité et les formes juridiques,” 1512.
- 48 Ibid.
- 49 Ibid., 1513.

- 50 Ibid., 1513-1514.
- 51 Ibid., 1500.
- 52 Ibid., 1509.
- 53 Ibid., 1502.
- 54 Ibid. These words seem to invite a comparison with Foucault's analyses of rhetoric and philosophy from the early 1980s. Obviously, such a comparison is well beyond the scope of this contribution.